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Abstract 
 
 Economists have concentrated on aggregate economic growth to measure countries’ 
development progress and in recent years have also considered income distribution performance. 
This paper reverses the conventional emphasis by placing income distribution at the forefront. I 
examine what is known about the distributions of income and poverty in the developing 
countries of the world and probe the correlations between poverty, inequality, and development. 
I explore the main sources of inequality and the extent to which individual countries have 
managed to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality in the course of economic growth. 
Employing evidence from case studies of six developing nations, I suggest some explanations for 
differing patterns of development and call for development planning founded on a firm 
commitment to helping the poor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The central question addressed here is the following: Who benefits how much from 
economic development and why? Among the subsidiary questions to be examined are these: 
What is known about the distributions of income and poverty in the poor countries of the world? 
What are the correlates of the observed patterns? What are the main sources of inequality? V/hat 
indices should be used to measure the participation of the poor in economic development? What 
is the welfare economic bash for this choice? To what extent have individual countries alleviated 
their poverty and reduced their inequality in the course of economic growth? 
 The research strategy followed here differs from the conventional approach. Usually, 
economists focus on growth but weigh the growth performance by the distributional record. Most 
of the profession would rank development as follows (ordered from best to worst): 
1. Rapid growth, good distributional performance. 
2. Rapid growth, poor distributional performance. 
3. Slow growth, good distributional performance. 
4. Slow growth, poor distributional performance. 
5. Nongrowth. 
 Another approach is followed in this paper. Rather than regarding GNP growth as the 
principal outcome of a country’s development performance, I look upon the growth rate of GNP 
as am important determinant of changing poverty and inequality. I set aside for now the 
traditional question—Does the type of distributional pattern found in a country promote or 
hinder growth?—and ask instead: Do the rate and type of growth promote or hinder 
distributional goals? What explains different countries’ performances? 
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 What follows is a necessarily brief examination of these issues for those less developed 
countries (LDCs) for which data are available. Arguments and evidence outlined here sire 
developed at greater length in Fields (1980). 
 
2. MEASURING WHO BENEFITS FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The task confronting those who study the microeconomics of development is to process 
individual or family level data on income (or consumption or basic human needs) in ways 
appropriate to the economic problem at hand (which, to repeat, is: who benefits how much from 
economic growth?). Different kinds of approaches to measuring who benefits appear in the 
literature. Table 1 presents examples of each. My point in this section is to show that the 
approach chosen does make a very real difference. 
 In studies of distribution and development, it is customary to present data on growth of 
national income and change in relative income inequality.1 The authors of these studies treat 
social welfare as depending positively on the level of national income and negatively on the 
inequality in the distribution of that income (measuring inequality, for example, by the Gini 
coefficient or equality by the income share received by the poorest 40% of income recipients). A 
falling share received by the poorest or a rising Gini coefficient is termed by these authors a 
“worsening of the income distribution,” and it is generally thought to be bad when rising 
inequality is encountered. 
                                                          
1 Examples are Kuznets (1955, 1963), Weisskoff (1970), Fishlow (1972), Adelman and Morris (1973), 
Chenery et al. (1974), Berry and Urrutia (1976), Adelman and Robinson (1973), and Fei. Ranis, and Kuo 
(1979) 
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 Example 1 in Table 1 illustrates how the judgments of the preceding paragraph are 
brought to bear in practice. Country B grew twice as fast as country A. However, relative income 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient and income share of the lowest 40%, seems to be 
“worse” in country B than in country A; that is, it would appear that the rich benefited at the 
expense of the poor, whose relative income share deteriorated. A development economist might 
question whether the higher rate of growth in country B was “worth it” in terms of income 
distribution, and a well-meaning development planner seeking to give very high weight to 
alleviation of inequality might go so far as to choose country A’s policies over country B’s. 
 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 
 Data on distribution and development may be presented in other ways. Consider now 
another numerical example for two hypothetical countries at an earlier and a later stage of 
economic development. Suppose the “poor” are those who work in low wage jobs, while the 
“nonpoor” work at higher wages. A widely accepted social welfare judgment2 is that welfare is 
higher when a smaller proportion of the population is poor. Take the income data in Example 2, 
assuming all income comes from labor and everybody is employed at one wage or the other. In 
both countries, the poor received the benefits of growth, but in country D twice as many poor 
benefited. Other things being equal, development economists would almost certainly rate country 
D as superior, and development planners would seek to determine the causes of that country’s 
                                                          
2 Indeed, it’s the raison d'être for the field of development economics and is used by nearly everyone in 
the field. 
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favorable experience and adopt those policies in their own countries. In this second example, the 
preference is clearcut, whereas in the previous example, the issue was open to doubt. 
 Yet another kind of approach is found in the literature.3 This approach measures the 
average absolute income (in constant dollars) received by a predetermined share of the 
population, e.g., the poorest 40%. The average income of the poorest 40% is taken as a measure 
of the poverty status of the population. Users of this approach regard social welfare as higher 
when poverty is less by this measure, i.e., when the average absolute income of the poorest 40% 
rises. 
 Consider now Example 3. It appears that there was no improvement in absolute income 
of the poorest 40% in either case. One might ask: why grow if the poor do not share in the 
benefits of growth? In this third example, E and F both seem to have failed to alleviate poverty. 
 In point of fact, countries A, C, and E are the same country, countries B, D, and F the 
same country!4 Real-world economic development histories and policy projections are often 
presented in these different ways. Yet, as comparisons of these data make clear, how we do it 
matters. 
 The income distribution measures used in the three sets of calculations are representative 
of more general classes. They are as follows: 
Example 1. Relative inequality approach, which looks at various groups’ income changes 
relative to others’. 
                                                          
3 Examples are Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) and Chiswick (1976). 
4 The respective income distributions, assuming ten income recipients in each are as follows: 
Initially in both countries: (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2) 
Later in A-C-E:      (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2) 
Later in B-D-F:      (1,1,1,1,1,1,1,2,2,2) 
The figure $40 in Example 3 assumes a 40 hour work week at $1/hour. 
Poverty, Inequality, and Development        7 
 
Example 2. Absolute income approach, which looks at changes in various groups’ 
incomes. A special case of the absolute income approach is: 
Example 2. Absolute poverty approach, which looks at the proportion poor and the 
incomes received by those who remain poor. 
Example 3. Relative poverty approach, which looks at changes in the absolute income of 
a fixed percentage at the bottom of the distribution. 
To summarize the hypothetical “facts” of the example: 
Indicator of Economic Performance Change in Indicator 
Growth Higher in B-D-F than in A-C-E 
Number of Workers in High Wage 
Employment 
Higher in both than initially, faster rise in B-
D-F 
Absolute Income Among High Wage 
Workers 
Unchanged in both cases 
Absolute Income Among Low Wage Workers Unchanged in both cases 
Absolute Poverty 
Lower in both than initially, greater reduction 
in B-D-F 
Relative Inequality  Higher in both than initially, higher in B-D-F 
Relative Poverty No apparent change in either case 
 
 Weighing these facts according to the various income distribution approaches, we come 
to the following conclusions. By the absolute income and absolute poverty criteria, B-D-F 
clearly is preferable to A-C- E. Using the relative inequality criterion, it is difficult to judge: 
Although B-D-F grew faster than A-C-E, inequality seems to have worsened.5 Finally by the 
relative poverty criterion, both appear equally unsatisfactory, since neither country seems to have 
                                                          
5 Whether inequality really worsened, even in relative terms, is not entirely obvious when one looks at the 
figures as presented in Example Two. 
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made progress in alleviating poverty; in fact, poverty was being alleviated in both and at 
different rates.6 
 The point I come to is this: How income distribution is studied— whether in terms of 
relative income inequality, absolute income and absolute poverty, or relative poverty—may lead 
to fundamentally different judgments about the success or failure of economic growth—even to 
questioning whether there was any development at all. 
 The discrepancies among the various approaches are based in part on legitimate 
differences in value judgments as to what aspects of less developed countries' income 
distributions are worrisome, in part on a statistical pattern which in some respects is artefactual. 
Section 3 offers a welfare economic analysis of these issues. 
 
3. WELFARE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
 
 Section 2 raised three important questions, which this section seeks to clarify: 
1. In assessing the distributional consequences of growth, welfare judgments are inevitable. 
Do we wish to give greater weight in our judgments to the alleviation of absolute poverty 
or to the narrowing of relative income inequality? 
2. What is it about the process of economic: development that causes the various 
approaches to differ in the example? 
3. How suited are the various approaches to the alternative kinds of development? 
                                                          
6 Note that the difficulties with the relative poverty measure arise in cross sectional data, where we look at 
those who are the poorest 40% ex post at different times. If we Lad longitudinal data, and were able to 
trace the progress of those individuals who were the poorest 40% ex ante, the problem would not arise. 
This is because their average income would be higher the faster the rate of growth of higher-paying 
employment. Unfortunately to my knowledge, longitudinal data are not available for a representative 
sample of the population in any less developed country. 
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 The first question poses the choice between absolute and relative income measures in 
determining the beneficiaries of growth. The choice depends on basic ethical considerations that 
must be confronted. 
 For me, as for many other observers, the plight of the poor in less developed countries is 
objective, to the extent that they do not have command over sufficient resources to feed and 
clothe themselves and avoid disease. In this way of thinking, poverty is an absolute condition 
requiring analysis in absolute terms. Predominant emphasis in this approach is given to data on 
changes in the number of poor, the average extent of their poverty, and possibly to the degree of 
income inequality among them.7 
 Others have different concerns and make different judgments. They give great weight to 
the subjective feelings of the poor who may feel relatively worse off if others’ economic 
positions are improving and theirs are not. Observers who feel strongly about such relative 
income considerations are justified in using relative inequality measures. 
 What is not justified, and there are many examples of this in the development literature, 
is the coupling of a concern over the absolute economic misery of the poor with reliance on 
calculations of changes in relative inequality over time. I fear this approach may be mistaken and 
misleading, quite apart from its logical inconsistency. For just as in the numerical example 
above, by assigning heavy weight to changes in the usual indices of relative income inequality 
and interpreting these increases as offsets to the economic well-being brought about by growth, 
important tendencies toward the alleviation of absolute poverty may be overlooked. 
 The second question raised at the beginning of this section addresses the nature of 
economic development itself. The example of Section 2 illustrated a particular kind of growth, 
                                                          
7 For more on this, see Sen (1976). 
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the main feature of which is its unevenness. If, in keeping with the dualism tradition in the 
development field, we regard the economy as consisting of an advanced “modern” sector and a 
backward “traditional” sector, the pattern depicted in the example illustrates what might be 
called “modern sector enlargement growth.” The essence of modern sector enlargement growth 
is that the economy is assumed to grow by enlarging the size of its modern sector, the incomes 
(or wages) within the modern and traditional sectors remaining the same. The discrepancy 
among the various income distribution measures in modern sector enlargement growth arises 
because this type of growth affects only some of the poor, not all. Consequently, those whose 
situations are not improved, and who therefore remain as poor as before, receive the same dollar 
amount, but it is a smaller part of a larger whole. From this, it follows that: 
1. the absolute incomes of the poorest 40% are unchanged; and 
2. the Lorenz curve shifts downward at its lower end, so those Lorenz-curve-based 
measures of relative income inequality that are sensitive to the lower end of the income 
distribution register a “worsening” of the income distribution. 
 
The Lorenz curve crossing is illustrated in Fig. la. 
 A number of authors have analyzed relative inequality in modern sector enlargement 
growth and have shown that relative inequality necessarily rises in the early stages of modern 
sector enlargement growth, reaches a peak, and then declines as modern sector enlargement 
growth continues, thus tracing out Kuznets’ (1955) famous inverted-U pattern.8 Most observers 
interpret the inverted-U in modern sector enlargement growth as signifying that in a true 
economic sense “the distribution of income must get worse before it gets better.” I do not. Note 
                                                          
8 See Swamy (1967), Robinson (1976). Knight (1976), and Fields (1980); extensive examples were 
offered by Kuznets (1955) and Lydail (1977). 
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that the intersectoral income differential is not changing. The only change is for the better, a 
movement of people out of the low-income traditional sector into the higher-income modern 
sector I conclude that the apparent “worsening” of the income distribution in the early stages of 
modern sector enlargement growth is a statistical artifact without social welfare content Put 
differently, if relative-inequality-averse observers compare standard measures like Gini 
coefficients or income shares of the poorest 40% when modern sector enlargement growth is 
taking place, they may be led to social welfare judgments that they themselves might not wish to 
make. A new welfare economics of modern sector enlargement growth is needed. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 The third question above questions the welfare economic foundations for assessing 
alternative kinds of development. Three other stylized typologies may be identified, and they are 
less problematical. 
 We might begin by defining “modern sector enrichment growth” as the case where real 
income is rising among a fixed number in the modern sector while real income among those left 
in the traditional sector remains unchanged. Relative inequality rises in this kind of growth, as 
shown by the Lorenz curve in Fig. lb. This rising inequality is economically meaningful. 
Whether it is sufficiently important to lead the observer to prefer nongrowth is a matter of value 
judgment. 
 We might define “traditional sector enrichment growth” as a situation in which the real 
incomes of traditional sector workers rise while the incomes of modern sector workers and the 
division of the labor force between the modern and traditional sectors remains unchanged. The 
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Lorenz curve in Fig. 1c illustrates that relative inequality falls if there is traditional sector 
enrichment. By standard welfare judgments, this type of growth would be viewed favorably. 
 One other case is not development at all “Traditional sector immiserization” would lower 
national income and raise poverty and inequality. It is frowned upon. 
 The preceding analysis suggests that the standard measures of income inequality and the 
welfare interpretations derived therefrom are better suited to enrichment kinds of development 
than to modern sector enlargement. Although no real world country is a pure case of any of these 
types of growth (or nongrowth), the presence of a substantial enlargement component may 
undermine the usefulness of ti e standard procedures. 
 By most accounts, modern sector enlargement is an essential ingredient of development. 
In their famous book, Fei and Ranis (1964) wrote, “... the heart of the development problem may 
be said to lie in the gradual shifting of the center of gravity of the economy from the agricultural 
to the industrial sector…gauged in terms of the reallocation of the population between the two 
sectors in order to promote a gradual expansion of industrial employment and output.” This 
characterization is echoed by Kuznets (1966) and Lewis (1954). Empirical studies such as that of 
Turnham (1971) have documented the absorption of an increasing share of the population into 
the modern sector as growth takes place. 
 We may safely conclude that modern sector enlargement comprises a large and perhaps 
even predominant component of the growth of currently developing countries, it must be 
evaluated more carefully. 
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4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON RELATIVE INEQUALITY9 
 
On Inequality at Different Stages of Development 
 
 Many authors have examined cross-sectional data on income inequality and stage of 
development. These studies (among them, Paukert 1973, Cline 1975, Chenery and Syrquin 1975, 
and Ahluwalia 1976) suggest that the relationship between relative inequality and per capita 
GNP tends to have an inverted-U shape: among groups of countries in the cross section, 
inequality rises in the early stages of economic development and falls in the middle and later 
stages. In all cases, the proportion of vacation in inequality explained by income level is small, 
suggesting that the initial stage of rising inequality is avoidable.10 
 In addition to the association between level of GNP and income inequality , these authors 
have also found that the usual concomitants of economic development—in particular,, improved 
education, declines in the importance of agriculture, urbanization, and reduced population 
growth—are significantly associated with relative income inequality in a cross section of LDCs, 
None of the existing studies finds a statistically significant relationship between the level of 
inequality and the short-run rate of economic growth. They also fail to establish any substantial 
correlation between inequality on the one hand and the importance of tax systems and 
agricultural productivity improvements on the other. None of these correlates of inequality is 
decisive, in the sense of accurately discriminating between high and low inequality countries. 
 
 
                                                          
9 See Fields (1980, Chapter 4) for details. 
10 This is true for all functional forms: parabolic, skewed inverted-U, or set of dummy variables. 
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On Inequality Change in Less Developed Countries 
 
 We now have studies of changing relative inequality in the actual economic development 
histories of more than twenty less developed countries. The experiences of the thirteen countries 
for which data sources appear to be reliable are briefly summarized in Table 2. For this group of 
countries, the evidence shows that inequality rose in seven countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico), fell in five (Costa Rica, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan), and is mixed but leaning toward a slight decline for one 
country (India). We may conclude that inequality has risen in slightly more countries than it has 
fallen, but no necessary pattern emerges. 
 
 
Insert Table 2 Here 
 
 
 Earlier, we saw that the level of inequality in a cross section of countries tends to be 
systematically related to several aspects of countries’ economic structure but none of these 
factors was found to be decisive. When it comes to charges in inequality, the evidence is 
similarly mixed. Scattered studies provide some information on the association between changes 
in the various determinants of income and changes in income inequality. No general relationship 
has thus far been encountered between changing inequality on the one hand and initial level of 
inequality, level of GNP, or rate of growth of GNP on the other. A thorough-going analysis of 
the relation between changing income distribution and countries’ development policies and 
performance worldwide is yet to be undertaken. Some evidence for a limited sample of countries 
is summarized in Section 6 below. 
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On Decomposing LDC Inequality 
 
 From an examination of empirical evidence on three types of decompositions of 
inequality, several conclusions may be drawn: 
 Source decomposition studies determine which income sources account for how much of 
overall income inequality. From studies of Taiwan, Pakistan, and Colombia, variation in labor 
incomes emerges as the predominant factor accounting for income inequality. This is because 
labor income has the largest functional income share and because most households receive most 
or all of their income from the work they do. This implies that to understand the structure of 
income inequality in LDCs, knowledge of the determinants of incomes from wages and self-
employment incomes paramount, as does an understanding of the functioning of LDC labor 
markets. 
 Sector decomposition studies ask how much inequality occurs within each sector or 
region of a country and how important are these intrasectoral inequalities relative to intersectoral 
inequality. Empirical studies on this question in many countries including Iran, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, plus the countries listed in the next paragraph, indicate a great deal more inequality 
within regions than across them. This implies the need to look within regions for other sources of 
income variability, at the level of either the worker or his job, to ascertain the sources of 
inequality. In addition, for policy purposes, these findings lead to the conclusion that antipoverty 
programs must be targeted at the poor within all regions. To limit attention to poorer regions 
only is too blunt a method of planning. 
 A third group of decomposition studies breaks down inequality by income-determining 
characteristics From this literature, which covers Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Colombia, Chile, 
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Venezuela, and Panama, we find that more h .quality is attributable to variation in personal 
characteristics than to the sector of employment or locational aspects. The most powerful 
personal characteristics explaining inequality are education and age. Occupation, economic 
sector, and location make some contribution to explaining inequality, but these variables are 
found to have lesser effects. 
 Singly and together, decomposition studies in less developed countries lead to an 
inescapable conclusion: income variation according to attributes of individuals are of primary 
importance whereas variations between economic segments grouped according to sector of the 
economy or functional income source play a secondary role. Given this overall conclusion, the 
need for further microeconomic income determination studies stands out. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON ABSOLUTE INCOMES AND ABSOLUTE POVERTY 
 
 To analyze the determinants of absolute incomes, the earnings function developed by 
labor economists is a useful starting point Together, characteristics of the individual (such as 
education, age, sex, and other demographic attributes) and variables pertaining to the demand 
side of the labor market (such as capital-intensity of the industry in which the individual works) 
explain at least half the variance in income and often substantially more (Psacharopoulos 1978). 
Human capital theory holds that education, training, and skills are the most important 
determinants of incomes. However, the finding that incomes and earnings are associated with 
more than just personal characteristics has led some analysts to question the relevance of the 
human capital framework in an LDC context and to look for an alternative. One such alternative 
is segmentation theory. 
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 Segmentation theory starts with an obvious truth: that labor markets are not 
homogeneous, as evidenced by the fact that earnings differentials are systematically associated 
with worker and employer characteristics. Some segmentation theorists assert that segmentation 
theory thereby helps us explain inequality. It doesn’t, at least at that level. Segmentation cannot 
both be defined by labor income inequality and be the cause of it. For segmentation theory to be 
useful, the barriers to mobility between labor market segments must be identified and their 
influences measured. It must be shown both that these barriers to mobility limit some 
individuals’ income opportunities and how much their opportunities are limited. Research in this 
area will enrich our understanding of the forces determining low incomes in poor countries, but 
very little is known right now about these barriers and segments. 
 The interest in absolute incomes leads us to examine absolute poverty. Two pressing 
concerns stand out: What produces poverty? Is absolute poverty being alleviated with economic 
growth? Evidence from household surveys and censuses has shed light on both these issues. 
 Poverty profiles have been constructed for a number of countries (see Fields 1980, Table 
5.2). The poor are disproportionately young, female, and in large families. If employed, it is 
more apt to be in agricultural occupations and rural areas or in petty commerce, services, and 
other backward sectors. A disproportionate number of the poor are self-employed, and if in 
agriculture, own disproportionately little land. This profile of poverty confirms many casual 
impressions, but hard quantitative evidence has been at something of a premium. 
 What about the relationship between absolute poverty and growth? The time series 
evidence, which until now has been widely scattered, is summarized in Table 3. The data show 
ten countries (Bangladesh, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand) in which poverty has diminished to varying degrees. Absolute 
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poverty was not ameliorated in the other countries (Argentina, India, aid the Philippines), 
poverty increasing noticeably in all three. 
 
 
Insert Table 3 Here 
 
 
 Both the direct evidence from time series given in Table 3 and the indirect evidence from 
cross-sectional studies (e.g., Ahluwalia 1976) lead to the same general result: growth reduces 
poverty. Many countries' experiences fit this rale, though of course there are exceptions. The 
exceptions are of two kinds. Some countries have alleviated poverty substantially despite little 
economic growth. Others have experienced substantial economic growth, yet the data show no 
demonstrable reduction in absolute poverty. 
 
6. DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS AND GROWTH STRATEGIES 
 
 Two fundamental questions remain: Which countries upgraded the economic positions of 
their poor at faster rates than others? What combinations of circumstances and policies led to 
differential performance? My conclusions are as follows: 
 (1) The absolute poverty and relative inequality measures produce similar distributional 
judgments in a bare majority of cases. The two classes of measures have been calculated in 
twelve countries and agree with respect to direction of income distribution change in seven of the 
twelve cases. In five of these (Costa Rica, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan), both 
poverty and inequality declined, while in two others (Argentina and the Philippines) both poverty 
and inequality increased. In five cases, however, the absolute poverty and relative inequality 
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measures are in conflict. In Bangladesh, Brazil, Mexico, and Puerto Rico, although relative 
inequality increased, absolute poverty was alleviated. A reverse pattern is found in India. There, 
relative inequality showed a slight decline, yet absolute: poverty rose substantially. 
 These results suggest that the choice of an absolute poverty or relative inequality measure 
is important empirically as well as theoretically in assessing the participation of the poor in 
economic development. We must choose between absolute poverty and relative inequality 
measures in accordance with the value judgments we wish to make. Perhaps the measurement 
issues posed in Section 2 and the welfare economic analysis of Section 3 will aid in this choice. 
 In Fields (1980, Chapter 6), the development progress and growth strategies in six 
countries are analyzed in some detail. The highlights are summarized below. 
 (2) A high rate of aggregate economic growth rate is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
reducing absolute poverty. The six countries’ experiences are shown in Table 4. 
 “Trickle down ' theory holds that incomes of the poor rise when economic growth is 
taking place. By this theory, we would expect the six countries to appear in the upper right and 
lower left cells of Table 4. In fact, four countries’ experiences accord with this prediction. 
However, two deviant cases stand out—the Philippines and Sri Lanka. The Philippines grew 
rapidly, yet incomes of the poor were not appreciably raised. On the other hand, Sri Lanka grew 
very slowly, yet absolute poverty was substantially reduced. We have no readily calculable index 
of these countries’ commitment to helping the poor toward a better life. Nonetheless, it can fairly 
be said that in both countries the outcome is clearly linked to public policy—welfare statism as 
part of a large scale antipoverty campaign in Sri Lanka, virtual inattention to the poverty problem 
in the Philippines over the period of analysis. 
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Insert Table 4 Here 
 
 
 (3) A high rate of aggregate economic growth is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
reducing relative inequality, as shown in the Table 5. 
 The two fastest growing countries—Taiwan and Costa Rica—experienced declining 
inequality, as did the two slowest growing countries—Sri Lanka and India. These four countries 
pursued development strategies in which rural development figured heavily. Inequality increased 
in the two countries with moderate to high growth rates—the Philippines and Brazil. Both these 
countries followed uneven development strategies aimed at modern industrial enclaves that 
engage relatively few people. 
 These data suggest a pattern that may not be entirely accidental. It is arguable, though far 
from proven, that a distributionally oriented development program that integrates the poor into 
the mainstream of the economy may cause a higher growth rate, other things equal. Obversely, a 
development strategy aimed at a limited segment of the economy may result in a lower growth 
rate than could be achieved given that country's resource endowment. In the present state of our 
knowledge, we do not understand the economic, political, or sociological dynamics of growth 
well enough to evaluate the merits of this argument. Research on this quest on merits highest 
priority among development economists and planners. 
 
 
Insert Table 5 Here 
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 (4) Commitment toward helping the poor is neither necessary nor sufficient to insure 
progress. India, it seems, was committed to improving conditions for the poor, at least if one 
believes the rhetoric (though the actuality may have beer; otherwise); despite its seeming 
commitment, India did not succeed. Taiwan did not appear to be particularly committed, judging 
from public pronouncements; but its actions suggest that it may well have done man) of the fight 
things for the purpose of helping, the poor majority. Sri Lanka was committed and did succeed. 
Brazil and the Philippines showed little commitment toward spreading the benefits of growth 
widely; in both countries, the gains were highly concentrated. 
 These country studies lead me to advance a general rule as a working hypothesis: In the 
absence of a firm commitment to developing for the poor and the courage to act on that 
commitment, it seems only natural that economic systems will perpetuate the flow of resources 
to the haves with at best some trickle-down to the have-nots. More may trickle-down to the poor 
in some cases than in others. Commitment toward developing to help the poor does not guarantee 
progress, but it helps. 
 (5) Progress in alleviating poverty is mirrored in changing labor market conditions. The 
poor may benefit from economic growth because of modern sector enlargement or traditional 
sector enrichment. I define “modern sector enlargement” as an expansion in the number of 
relatively high-paying jobs so as to employ a larger percentage of the economically active 
population. “Traditional sector enrichment” is the increase in wages, or incomes in the major 
occupational groups in which the poor are found. Qualitative data on the enlargement and 
enrichment; components of development in the six countries are displayed in Table 6. In the two 
countries with both high rates of modern sector enlargement and indications of traditional sector 
enrichment (Taiwan and Costa Rica), poverty was alleviated rapidly. The two countries with 
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modern sector enlargement or traditional sector enrichment but not both (Sri Lanka and Brazil) 
also alleviated poverty. In the two countries with neither modern sector enlargement nor 
traditional sector enrichment (the Philippines and India) absolute poverty worsened. This pattern 
implies that understanding the forces influencing employment and wage structures in less 
developed country labor markets and their changes over time is central to explaining the causes 
of poverty and its amelioration or exacerbation in the process of economic growth. But that is a 
whole other study yet to be done. 
 
 
Insert Table 6 Here 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Improving the income distribution is today a favorite goal of development economists 
and planners. Unfortunately, there is no clear agreement as to what that objective really means. 
Three alternative income distribution concepts—relative inequality, absolute poverty, and 
relative poverty—were distinguished in this paper. Sometimes, in the pursuit of one of these 
income distribution objectives, another may suffer. For instance, given resource and policy 
constraints, a strategy of building up an investible surplus in the hands of the middle and upper 
classes may lead to rising inequality. This inequality might have to be tolerated in order to 
generate enough additional production to permit absolute poverty to be alleviated. In this event, 
poverty alleviation and inequality reduction are conflicting objectives. More generally, policies 
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must be formulated on the basis of a clear statement of purpose as to what the primary 
distributional objective in fact is. 
 One reasonable goal is the reduction of relative inequality. Both cross-sectional and time 
series studies reveal statistically significant but weak inverse relationships between the level of 
national income and the degree of relative income inequality. However, the exceptions to any 
general pattern are nearly as numerous as the supporting cases. Research into six countries’ 
experiences gives empirical support to the view that what matters in determining inequality is not 
growth itself but rather the kind of growth policies and strategies pursued. Decentralized 
development programs have indeed narrowed the relative gap between rich and poor. Policies 
such as rural development, export promotion, universal education, and wage restraint merit 
serious consideration in this regard. 
 Reducing absolute poverty may merit even higher priority. Although economic growth 
nay help lessen poverty, it is not sufficient. The character of the growth appears to be a more 
important determinant of poverty reduction than is the rate of grown. When growth policies are 
evaluated from an antipoverty perspective, some hard questions need to be asked. Are the growth 
policies oriented toward expanding earning opportunities and enlarging modern sector 
employment? Toward renting new markets for the goods produced by the poor? Toward 
distributing goods and services to them in order to fulfill their basic human needs? Only when 
these issues are addressed can we know if policies to promote growth actually contribute to 
development. 
 From studies of income determination, we have obtained poverty profiles and gotten 
insights into some of the causal mechanisms at work. The poor are found in large numbers in all 
industries, sectors, and regions. There is much more inequality within these aggregates than 
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between them. We may conclude from this that policy planning must be targeted at poor people 
rather than at poor groups, lest the advantaged members of the poorer groups appropriate the 
bulk of the benefits while the needy are not readied. Studies have also shown that labor income 
inequality accounts for the major part of total income inequality. It follows that research needs to 
be focused on the operation of labor markets and the determinants of job opportunities. 
 My own feeling is that a policy of allowing high concentrations of income and wealth 
and not attending to the poverty population may be doubly harmful. Not only does it leave less 
for the poor at present. Such a policy might in fact hamper economic growth if the rich spend 
their money abroad, purchase imported goods, and invest in unproductive ways such as in land 
speculation, whereas if the poor had those resources they would invest in the productivity of their 
farms, the quality of their houses, and the education of their children. Too little is known now to 
say whether this possibility is an actuality. 
 To assess what has happened in the past, to explain why it happened, and to plan for the 
future, refined models of growth as a cause of income distribution and of distribution as a cause 
of growth are needed. This paper will have succeeded if it has provided some of the factual and 
analytical bases for carrying out this task. 
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